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Saul Kripke' s influential theory of reference examines the
relationship between the name given to a referent and various
descriptive statements that can be made aboutit. In this essay,
I extend this theory of reference, as developed by Kripke and
Hilary Putnam, in an effort to critique and also develop Eric
Katz's argument in, "Organism, Community, and the 'Sub·
stitution Problem'."
I begin by explaining how Katz rejects an organism
model of species within an ecosystem because it allows for
the possibility of 'the substitution problem', and instead
favors a community model of associated individuals who are
valued both intrinsically and instrumentally. I then maintain
that Katz's distinction between the organism and the COIn
munity models is merely one of degree and is largely seman·
tic. The difference between the models is the way in which
they serve Katz's goal of differentiating between intrinsic
and instrumental value. I analyze this goal within the context
of Kripke' s theory of reference in a way that illumina tes some
of the issues contributing to the dispute between valuing
species intrinsically and instrumentally. Finally, I conclude
that Katz's counterfactual exercise and 'the substitution prob
lem'i if approached from the perspective of the Kripke's
theory of reference, can bring to light new considerations for
an ethic to address.
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Organism vs. Community
To analyze Eric Katz's holistic environmental ethic, it is
important first to understand his conceptual distinction be
tween the organism and community metaphors often used to
describe natural systems. In the next section, we will see tha t
there are significant problems with this distinction. The
organism model conceives of individual species as organs in
a larger organism, organs that cannot exist apart from the
organism. The community model conceives of individual
species as members of a larger group, but also acknowledges
that they have a measure of independence. For Katz, an
organism model is not desirable because it fails to value a
species for itself, intrinsically, and instead values a species
solely in terms of its functional, instrumental worth (Katz
249).1 Katz believes a feasible environmental ethic must
establish an acceptable balance between and include both
intrinsic and instrumental value. The community model, for
Katz, seems to fill this requirement.
Katz argues (incorrectly it would seem) thatthe organism
model fails to strike this balance between values, because it
imagines a species merely as a component, part, or unit
whose existence [in the natural system] is due to the con
tinuous functioning of the organic whole of which they are a
part" (Katz 245). A species is conceived of as an organ
necessarily dependent upon all the other organs in the sys
tem. By overemphasizing species' interdependence, Katz
argues, the organism model denies a species' independence,
its intrinsic value. The independence is lost, according to
Katz because, "an entity valued intrinsically requires no
relationship with any other entities" (Katz 249). But all
species require relationships with other entities to survive. It
seems that within this dependence there does exist an ele
ment of value which is granted to the species itself, to its
presence in the system as a whole; intrinsic value does seem
to be present.
II
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Katz argues that another undesirable result of the organ
model is •the substitu tion problem'. If a species is valued
only instrumentally, it is logically possible to replace that
species with either another species or a machine capable of
iuUilling its functional role in the natural system. Katz
explains, "what is really important is the role, not the species"
(Katz 251).: If this is true, the organism model allows for a
species to be replaced without remorse] because what is most
important is the ecosystemic organ, to which the species is
whollv subservient.
Eric Katz claims, however, that there is a model that
successfully embraces both the intrinsic value of a species as
well as the instrumental role it plays in the natural system.
This model is that of the community, which "focuses on both
functional value and autonomous intrinsic value of natural
entities in a sy-steml) (Katz 241). In this model, an entity exists
both as an individual (in its own right) and as a member
(constituting a unit) of a functioning community. A species,
as an entity in the community model, has a relatively inde
pendent existence and value over and above its value as a
member of the community. According to Katz this relatively
independent status makes a species in this model"similar to
an entity with intrinsic value; it possesses some value in itself
without regard to other entities" (Katz249). Itis clear that this
model solves 'the substitution problem' by recognizing that
species cannot be conceived solely as a functional unit in an
ecosystemic whole, by recognizing their intrinsic worth. In
recognizing both instrumental and intrinsic value, this model
creates the conw tions necessary for an effective environmen
tal ethic which recognizes and protects a species both for
itself and for its function.
A Degree Relationship: Organism and Community
Now that Katz's basic argument has been explicated, we
can tum to an examination of its seemingly unfounded
distinction followed by a Kripkean critique of this distinc
tion. A close reading of the article shows that the difference
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between an organism and a community is nothing more than
a difference of degree, one that weights intrinsic and instru
mental value. Therefore, Katz's criticism of the organism
model in favor of a supposedly more balanced version, the
communitymodel,is inaccurate in suggesting that the organ
ism model wholly excludes intrinsic value. Katz acknowl
edges that his distinction is merely a semantic differentiation
of degree in saying,
the model of community permits the consideration of
both intrinsic and instrumental value to a greater
extent than the model of organism. Since anorganism
is primarily concerned with the functions of interde
pendent parts, it emphasizes instrumental value. (Katz
249-50)3
In saying that what is important is the extent to which
value is acknowledged in the community model, Katz ex

presses his displeasure with the lesser degree to which the
organism model grants a species value. Katz favors an ethic
with a more even balance of-values, both intrinsic and instru
mental. But the organism model need not lack intrinsic value
entirely. In advocating the community model as a balanced
ethic, Katz makes it clear that a species necessarily has
intrinsic value merely by virtue of being natural:
[T]he intrinsic value of natural entities is their source
or origin - what causes them to be what they are. A
natural entity possesses intrinsic value to some extent
because it is natural, an entity that arose through
processes that are not artificially human. This 'natu
ralness' is one of the properties that gives it its value.
(Katz 254)4
Evidently, it is not that the organism model overlooks or
excludes intrinsic value, rather, Katz finds the degree to
which that model acknowledges this value inadequate for
forming a balanced environmental ethic. But because he has
explicitly said that species have intrinsic value merely by
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virtue of beingnatural, the substitution problem is a mislead
ing construct. Substituting a species valued both instrumen
tally and intrinsically, for that is what Katz claims a desirable
ethic would accomplish, would seem morally wrongeven for
a holist. If a species is valued intrinsically even to a dimin
ished extent, then it would be hypocritical for the valuers to
replace it with another intrinsically valued entity, since sub
stitution seems to presuppose thatneither the replaced species
nor the one replacing it has intrinsic value. Hence the 'substi
tution problem' amounts to a "straw man", since even most
holists would balk at the idea that species are nothing but
replaceable organs.
Katz makes clear what aspects of an environmental ethic
~e considers are important, namely, that it incorporate both
intrinsic and instrumental value into its framework, thereby
eliminating the possibility of the 'substitution problem' be
ing actualized. In whatfollows, I show how Kripke's theory
of reference can provide the basis for a thought experiment
leading to such an ethic. In addition, I indicate why an
application of Hilary Putnam's work with counterfactual
worlds provides additional reasons why 'the substitution
problem' is an implausible concern. Finally, I argue that their
work can also give the sort of rationale for preservation that
Katz believes a feasible ethic could provide.
The Theory of Reference

Kripke's theory of reference as explained in Naming and
Necessity is concerned with the extent to which descriptions
are related to names in the real world as well as in
counterfactual worlds. In reworking reference theory, Kripke
criticizes and ultimately overcomes the previous conclusions
concerning names and descriptions as suggested by such
philosophers as Frege and Russell. Frege for example be
lieves that names, spoken and written linguistic terms, are
synonymous with their ontological definite descriptions/'
statements that can be made about a referent's properties.
For Frege, names have the same meaning as descriptions;
II
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that is, names can'stand in for' /,be substituted for' descrip
tions. The particular description the speaker intends the
name to stand for is used to determine the referent of the
name" (Kripke 28).
By contrast, a name for Kripke is a rigid designator; that
is, it is nothing more than a strict label or a tag given to a
referent, to a unique identity. As Kripke states, "Let's call
something a rigid designator if in every possible world it
designates the same object ... [N]ames are rigid designators"
(Kripke 48). 5 The name, then, is rigidly tagged onto an object
across all possible worlds. However, a description, in Kripke' s
theory of reference, is not synonymous with a name; that is,
a description is not something that'stands for' a name or is
equivalent to it. If a name is 'x' in a given sentence, then in
Kripke's analysis, a description can not be substituted for' x'
and still maintain the same meaning (Kripke 48).6 A descrip
tion is a contingent statement from which a reference is fixed
or determined. Hence, lithe description used is not synony
mous with the name it introduces but rather fixes its refer
ence" (Kripke 96n).
In the new theory of reference, this description is most
directly aimed at proper names. In cases involving individu
als, the theory is easily applied, seeming almost
commonsensical. Kripke gives many such examples, one of
which concerns Aristotle. If the name i Aristotle' is the name
affixed to a specific object, then the statement 'Plato' s greatest
student' is, as a description, not a rigid designator but instead
is a statement about the contingent properties associated
with that name. It is contingent because if Aristotle were not
Plato's greatest student he would still have been called
,Aristotle'. The name is rigid, but the description in this case
is not.
Of special interest here is tl1e case in which a statement is
a definite description which can be used to isolate Aristotle'
as a unique individual. Such a case would be a statement in
which Aristotle were to state that he was born in'x' month to
'such and such parents'. The descriptions in this case point
only to the being named 'Aristotle' asa unique individual. In
II
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this caset the description indicates fundamental qualities/
essential properties that could only be held by one unique
individuaL When essential properties are used in a descrip
tive statement in this waYt that descriptiont tOOt is a rigid
designator. Then and only thent just as a name wouldt the
description tags the individual with its essential properties
(Kripke 28). These essential properties are exclusively neces~
sary characteristics or scientific facts about the individual
that are known definitely.
Common Nouns and General N ames As They Are Associ
ated With Natural Kinds
Another interesting relationship between name and de
scription that is especially significant in this analysis is how
Kripkets theory of names applies to common nouns and
general names. By applying the theory to a collection of
individuals t such as a species t the theory of names becomes
significant for environmental ethics. In these casest the name
used represents a group that has some commonalityt unlike
the previous cases where the names belonged to unique
individuals. Within these cases His the class of general names
associated with natural kinds - that iSt with classes of things
that we regard as of explanatory importance; classes whose
normal distinguishing characteristics are 'held together' or
even explained by deep-Iyingmechanismll (Putnam 102). It
becomes clear that when general names are usedt a wrinkle
is added to Kripkets theory of reference. Do the individual
members of the group lose some form of individuality by
being represented by a collective rigid designator? Whatis the
shared essence of the members in the group such that they can
all be tagged by the same nameT What implications does this
have for groups such as species and how does this affect an
environmental ethic? Hilary Putnam addresses many of
these unanswerable questions inhis development of Kripke s
theory of reference as it applies to groups.
l

l
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Putnam's investigation leads to a focus on essences of
groups with something in common. As he explains, "what
the essential nature is is not a matter of language analysis but
of scientific theory construction.. . (Putnam 105). Such
scientific constructions would resemble chemical breakdowns
or chromosomal structures of objects. Kripke suggests that,
II A priori, all we can say is that it is an empirical matter
whether the characteristics originally associated with the
kind apply to its members universally, or even ever, and
whether they are in fact jointly sufficient for membership in
the kind" (Kripke 137). As Putnam points out, there is one
obvious problem with such essential descriptions. Because
they represent a stereotype of the object, they do not account
for abnormalities. Despite this drawback, these descriptions,
have the status of rigid designa tion because they are based on
as the actual nature of the particular things as they can be
known by humankind. Kripke grants that, "In general,
science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to
find the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical
sense) [a priori] of the kind" (Kripke 138).
An example of essence, understood as what a thing
necessarily is according to science, is explained by Hilary
Putnam in an article entitled "Meaning and Reference,"
Putnam complicates the theory of reference and names a
hypothetical' substitution problem' in a counterfactual world.
This world contains a liquid possessing the same superficial
properties as Earth's water: "it is indistinguishable from
water at normal temperatures and pressures," except it is
composed of XYZ as opposed to H 20 (Putnam 121b). The
substance is known as and called 'water' inthis counterfactual
'Twin Earth' , but according to Putnam's analysis, largely
based on Kripke's, this substance is not water. It is a scientifi
cally known fact that in our world 'H20 is water' is a true
identity statement. That is, this statement is not contingently
known because it is an identity statement between two
names. In this case, if the statement "H20 =water" is true and
if they are both names (that is, they are rigid designators),
then "H20 = water" is a necessary truth. It is interesting to
/1
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note that even though the statement is not contingent, it still
must be true aposteriori. Because this non-contingent claim is
known aposteriori it involves an element of uncertainty. Even
though we know water to chemically be H 20, it is possible in
the future that, another scientifically determined composi
tion will be discovered thatis more accurate. The new theory
of reference, :insofar as it considers the essences of things,
rests on the dynamic shoulders of empirical science.

Species, Katz, and The New Theory of Reference
Many of the above mentioned examples and concepts
prove helpful when examining the main issues in Eric Katz's
article. The implications of the new theory are important in
giving additional reasons for the implausibility of/the substi
tution problem' as well as for providing a basis for arriving
at an environmental ethic similar to the community model'
from Katz's essay.
The substitution problem, as was explained earlier, is not
a plausible problem. If it is acknowledged that species have
intrinsic value by virtue of being natural, as was suggested
earlier, then it is not plausible that this"serious moral prob
lem," of replacing intrinsically valued species with other
entities capable of carrying out the original's understood
function in an ecosystem, could arise. Indeed, Ka tz admits in
his article that such a substitution has never really occurred.
After suggesting that such a thing could happen, how
ever, he also stated that if the substitution problem occurred
it would be morally wrong, because it directly"involves the
ideas of identity, integrity, or intrinsic value applied to
individual organisms and species" (Katz 253). He later says
in the article, "a technically adequate functional substitute,
because it is not an outgrowth of the original natural pro
cesses of the system, does not possess the same intrinsic value
as the original entity" (Katz 254,245). Therefore, the identi
ties of species are separate from and independent of each other.
Such natural independence is in part why something is
intrinsically valuable. This is very similar to the statement
I
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describing Kripke' s conception of identities being a combina
tion of origin and substance I both of which are essential. As
Kripke surmises, "If a material object has its origin from a
certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any
other matter" (Kripke 114). Because Kripke considers origin
andsubstanceuniquecharacteristicsofanindependentiden
tHy, it seems that these are the elements that cause a being to
be separate and independent.
It follows that, even if some other entity or mechanical
object were capable of replacing a species' functional rolet the
replacement would never 'be' the species. It would not
acquire the identity of the replaced species by mimicking the
functional role. Hilary Putnam gives a concise accountofthis
in the example of water on Twin Earth. Putnam explains that
even if XYZ fulfills the"operational definition," that is, has
the same superficial properties as water, it is not water
because it does not have the same essential properties as the
stuff on Earth (Putnam 129-30b). Therefore, by usingPutnam's
example I maintain that in Katz's 'substitution problem',
even if the functional role is fulfilled and the thing looks
superficially like the original species, it is not and cannot be
that species, since its essence is necessarily different. The
origin and substance of the two species are different; there
fore, the identity of the replacement species is different from
that of the original species: A species cannot be replaced.
Although on the surface this link between Katz and
Kripke's analysis seems tenuous, it is important to under
stand, because Kripke guarantees the identity and individu
ality of unique beings. It follows, in Kripke's analysis, that a
separate entity has also a separate identity and essence, since
identity is tied up in origin and substance (Kripke 114). It is
unique in its fundamental properties which set it away from
and distinguish it from other entities. Although many of
these properties may be shared with other entities (such as
function which could be mimicked), science and philosophy
grantthatthereissomething, an essence, thatisuniqueto that
specific entity. It is helpful here to repeat Katz's claim that,
the intrinsic value of natural entities is their source or origin.
II
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.. " (Katz 254, 249-50). These conclusions provide the base for
a balanced ethic by privileging origin and uniqueness over
mere "role" within an ecosystem. A combined consideration
of all three of these properties helps locate the intrinsic and
instrumental value of each species.
As we have seen, by attempting to extend this principle
to common names, Putnam also extends the analysis of
essence. If the theory of names is applied to a collective entity
(a species for instance), then that group should have some
fundamental, essential property that grants it indiViduality
and distinction. In Katz' s article this is explained as justifica
tion for the preservation of rare species which, it seems, no
longer have any instrumental worth in an ecosystem. Be
cause a Panda Bear is fundamentally unlike any other spe
cies, since it maintains its own identity and essential proper
ties, it is intrinsic value that justifies preserving the species.
As Katz explains,
They have no instrumental value [supposedly], since
the ecological system seems to function quite well
without them. Thus, if they are to be preserved or
protected, as environmentalist policies universally
dictate, it must be because of their intrinsic value.
(Katz 255)
One concern that could arise from applying theory of
name principles to groups is that anindividual ina group will
lose its individuality and merely represent the 'group es
sence' as a whole. This difference is not however lost, His,in
part, indicated in a semantic specification - the names are
different. Let's take the case of a herd of deer. Because they
are a group how is it possible that each member in the group
is a distinct individual if they do not have different names? It
is possible if, when referring to a specific deer, we say, 'that'
deer. 'That', in this case, is a rigid designator intended to
indicate only one deer from the herd.
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Another way to support Katz's search for an adequate
environmental ethic is to examine his use of counterfactual
worlds in view of Kripke's thought. In so doing, we can
arrive at a theoretically-based appeal which leads to a ratio
nale for preservation that is very similar to Katz's community
model. Hence, Kripke's theory can inform the future devel
opment of a feasible environmental ethic that advocates
species preservation.
By applying Kripke's philosophy, we come to a rather
astonishing realization. As was mentioned earlier, because
of the uncertainty of science necessary truths, essences, and
essential properties cannot always be known apriori. If, then,
there is still much to learn about relationships and essences
and composition, any description that is not 'analytic's car
ries with it an element of doubt. Kripke is careful to deal with
this topic in Naming and Necessity. In a footnote he indicates
that he did not try to deal with the delicate issues involving
analyticity here, but does acknowledge Putnam's work
(Kripke 122-23). Later, however, in the summary, he warns
that, "For species, as for proper names, the way the reference
of a term is fixed should not be regarded as'a synonym for the
term" (Kripke 135).
Following this realization, we can see the danger in
considering fixed references to be analytic truths. It is still
true in our world that definite descriptions, descriptions
which supposedly capture the essence of a thing or species,
can change as our knowledge increases and develops. We
first had to learn that water =H 20. It may still be the case, as
was mentioned earlier, that H 20 may not be the most accu
rate representation of water's composition. Just so, then, that
our understanding of what constitutes a species' eSSel'lCe, is
based on society's understanding of its chemical composi
tion, its chromosomal makeup, and even its ecosystemic
role.. This description, it seems, is not necessarily analytic,
but is just a description that at least temporarily 'fixes the
referent!. Our knowledge about a species' essence may
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change in the future. In view of these empirical scientific
matters, we may doubt that a successful analytic statement
about a species in possible.
These arguments about a species' value and its essence
are fundamental in developing an understanding of the
relationship between, not only a species and its role, but also
one species with another. It is only possible, once this
relationship is understood, to make a determination about
the continued existence or obliteration of a unique identity.
Although this investigation of Katz from Kripke's perspec
tive does not neatly solve the problems surrounding species
valuation, it informs the debate, developing the issues in
question. If there is no way for us to 'know' what a species'
r~al essence is, or its role is not a part of its essence, it follows
that Kripke's theory of names could assist both the impetus
for preservation and the justification for destruction. Preser
vation would be based on the arguments I have illuminated
in this essay, and destruction could be justified because of
what is not known. There is still a personal judgment
involved that theory can only influence, not dictate. It is,
however, helpful to note that our understandings of a spe
cies, as was shown above, is merely dependent upon a fixed
reference based upon the knowledge we have, not the knowl
edge we might gain. Simply, preservation need not be based
on an instrumental futurity because of the knowledge we
lack or could lack - even if we do not consider the potential
use-value of a species, because it is valued intrinsically by
virtue of being naturat it seems as though it should not be
destroyed or replaced.
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NOTES

1. Katz makes it clear that an ethic based solely on a
species' intrinsic worth is equally unacceptable. It seems that
this intrinsically valuable ethic would lead to a completely
individualistic ethic denying species interdependency, since
An entity valued intrinsically requires no relationships with
any other entities."
2. Italics added.
3. Italics added.
4. It is interesting to question Katz's meaning when he
says 'artificially human'. For instance, is an animal that is
conceived through artificial insemination in a zoo not consid
ered natural because its origins are in some fundamental way
artificial human processes?
5. Italics added. See also p. 58
6. A description is not a rigid designator that is just like
a name "unless (of course) we happen to use essential prop
erties in our description" (57).
7. There is extensive literature which investigates these
concerns, much of the work of Hilary Putnam, but this topic
is for the most part beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Kripke understood analyticity to be descriptions that
were both necessary and a priori.
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